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Abstract: 
 
Perspective taking is often the glue that binds people together. However, we propose that in 
competitive contexts, perspective taking is akin to adding gasoline to a fire: It inflames already-
aroused competitive impulses and leads people to protect themselves from the potentially 
insidious actions of their competitors. Overall, we suggest that perspective taking functions as a 
relational amplifier. In cooperative contexts, it creates the foundation for prosocial impulses, but 
in competitive contexts, it triggers hypercompetition, leading people to prophylactically engage 
in unethical behavior to prevent themselves from being exploited. The experiments reported here 
establish that perspective taking interacts with the relational context—cooperative or 
competitive—to predict unethical behavior, from using insidious negotiation tactics to materially 
deceiving one’s partner to cheating on an anagram task. In the context of competition, 
perspective taking can pervert the age-old axiom “do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you” into “do unto others as you think they will try to do unto you.” 
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Articles: 
 
Perspective taking is often the cornerstone of a happy, functional marriage, the glue that binds 
spouses together. In divorce, however, taking a departing partner’s perspective may instead 
inspire deceit and chicanery. Indeed, some divorce attorneys recommend “fighting fire with fire” 
by imagining the duplicitous and underhanded activities the estranged spouse may be plotting—
removing assets from shared bank accounts, racking up credit-card bills, issuing restraining 
orders, and so forth—and preemptively using these tricks oneself (Johnson, 2013). Previously 
honorable individuals may take such unethical steps if they fear that their spouses plan to do the 
same against them. In the competitive context of divorce, perspective taking may act as gasoline 
being poured onto the growing fire of suspicion. 
 
The research reported here investigated whether, and under what conditions, perspective 
taking—the process of imagining the mind and thoughts of another individual—triggers 
unethical behavior. Counter to the notion that perspective taking creates and maintains social 
bonds (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005), we suggest that it works as a relational amplifier that 
intensifies existing cooperative or competitive impulses. Stated differently, perspective taking 
can change the Golden Rule from “do unto others as you would have them do unto you” to “do 
unto others as you think they will try to do unto you” (Batson & Moran, 1999). In neutral or 
cooperative contexts, perspective taking functions as the glue that binds people together by 
inducing sympathy and altruistic behavior. However, when individuals imagine the potential 
actions that their competitors will take against them, perspective taking is akin to pouring 
gasoline on a fire: It inflames already-aroused competitive impulses and incites individuals to 
engage in unethical behaviors in the service of protecting themselves. 
 
Perspective Taking as Social Glue 
 
The human capacity for perspective taking can often be the glue that holds and binds individuals 
and social groups together. Experimental research consistently demonstrates that the ability to 
see the world from another person’s point of view leads individuals to cooperate and offer aid 
across a myriad of social arenas. Specifically, perspective taking has been linked to greater 
empathy and altruism (Batson, 1994; Batson & Moran, 1999; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 
1978; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), increased willingness to volunteer time and money to help 
individuals facing hardship (Batson et al., 1991; Coke et al., 1978; Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 
1990), diminished accessibility and expression of stereotypes (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), 
reduced egocentrism (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005), and more objective 
judgments of fairness (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006). 
 
Perspective Taking as Social Gasoline 
 
Although perspective taking often serves as the glue that binds people together, growing 
evidence suggests that it can fuel antisocial behavior under certain circumstances. Perspective 
taking can promote more selfish behavior with competitors in resource dilemmas (Epley et al., 
2006), more retaliation against transgressors (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2011), and more negative 
construals of out-group members (Tarrant, Calitri, & Weston, 2012). These findings are 
consistent with work demonstrating that competition invites competition, even among 
individuals who initially hold cooperative orientations (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a, 1970b). 
Building on this research, as well as related work within economics (i.e., Nash, 1950), we offer a 
theory for understanding when and why perspective taking leads to antisocial behavior: 
Perspective taking serves to amplify the existing relational context (i.e., cooperative or 
competitive). In line with this reasoning, we proposed and tested the hypothesis that perspective 
taking would lead people to behave more unethically in competitive contexts. 
 
The Unethical Perspective Taker 
 
Research on ethics has traditionally focused on individual (e.g., demographics, personality traits) 
and situational (e.g., codes of conduct, organizational culture) characteristics (Kish-Gephart, 
Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). Emerging evidence, however, 
suggests that relationships also influence ethical decisions. In particular, in-group identification 
and shared group membership can lead people to imitate decisions to cheat (Gino, Ayal, & 
Ariely, 2009) and engage in unethical helping (Gino & Pierce, 2010). 
 
We extended this work by investigating the combined influence of relational context and 
perspective taking on unethical behavior. The common theoretical lens we offer to explain how 
perspective taking produces both prosocial and unethical behavior is that perspective taking 
works as a relational amplifier. In cooperative contexts, perspective taking draws one’s attention 
to the potential for shared interests and to the counterpart’s expected cooperative behavior. In 
contrast, in competitive contexts, perspective taking draws attention to conflicting interests and 
to how a competitor’s actions may threaten one’s own self-interest. Similar to the game-
theoretical lens of backward induction—determining one’s optimal choices on the basis of 
opponents’ anticipated actions (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2004)—taking the perspective of 
a competitor may focus one’s attention on the competitor’s potential use of unethical tactics to 
gain a competitive advantage. Indeed, individuals misrepresent or withhold information from 
people they perceive as competitors out of fear of exploitation (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004). 
Overall, we propose that perspective taking in competitive contexts leads people to do whatever 
it takes—including engaging in unethical behavior—to protect themselves from the imagined 
evil of their counterparts. 
 
Overview of the Present Research 
 
We conducted four experiments to test whether relational context moderates the effects of 
perspective taking on unethical behavior. Experiment 1 examined whether attending to the 
potential unethical behaviors of a competitor increases participants’ own willingness to employ 
unethical negotiation tactics. Experiment 2 explored the moderating effect of relational context—
cooperative versus competitive—on the effects of perspective taking on unethical intentions. 
Experiment 3 investigated how the combination of perspective taking and a competitive 
counterpart affects actual use of deception in a game involving real financial stakes. Finally, 
Experiment 4 divorced the opportunity to act unethically from the focal relationship to test 
whether taking the perspective of a competitor automatically activates a mind-set geared toward 
self-protection at any cost. 
 
Our research makes several important contributions. On the empirical front, we are the first to 
demonstrate that perspective taking can lead to increased unethical behavior. On the theoretical 
front, we offer a parsimonious model—perspective taking as a relational amplifier—to explain 
when and why perspective taking leads to antisocial rather than prosocial behavior. In 
cooperative contexts, perspective taking is the glue that binds people together and creates the 
foundation for prosocial behavior. However, in competitive contexts, it is analogous to pouring 
gasoline on a burning fire, promoting prophylactic use of unethical behavior to prevent potential 
exploitation. 
 
Experiment 1: The Ethical Cost of Thinking About Competitors 
 
Experiment 1 used the context of negotiations for an initial test of our hypothesis that taking a 
competitor’s perspective could lead to increased unethical behavior. 
 
Method 
 
One hundred twenty-one working M.B.A. students1 were randomly assigned to either a self-
firstor a competitor-first condition. All participants completed a survey that asked them to write 
about one of their company’s competitors: “Please take a minute to describe one of your 
company’s competitors. You can pick any company with which your company competes.” 
 
Next, participants imagined that they were involved in a negotiation with the company they had 
just described and rated the extent to which they and the competing company would be willing to 
use certain unethical negotiation tactics. These behavioral intentions were assessed with a seven-
item survey adapted from the Self-Reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies (SINS) scale 
(e.g., “Intentionally misrepresent factual information in order to support your negotiating 
arguments or position”; scale from 1, definitely would not use, to 7, definitely would be willing to 
use; Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000). Participants in the self-first condition rated their 
own intended negotiation behavior first and then rated their competitor’s. Participants in the 
competitor-first condition rated the competitor first and then themselves. These measures of 
participants’ own willingness to engage in unethical bargaining (α = .70) and their competitor’s 
willingness to engage in unethical bargaining (α = .79) were both reliable. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
A mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant interaction between 
experimental condition (between subjects; self-first vs. competitor-first) and the target of the 
rating (within subjects; self vs. competitor), F(1, 119) = 6.55, p = .012. As Figure 1 shows, 
participants who considered their competitor’s negotiation behavior prior to their own reported 
having greater unethical intentions (M = 3.22, SD = 1.10) than did those who considered their 
own intentions first (M = 2.83, SD = 0.76), t(119) = −2.25, p = .026. Ratings of the competitor’s 
unethical intentions, however, did not differ between conditions (3.91 vs. 3.90), t(119) = 
0.02, p = .985. 
 
Fig. 1. Rated unethical intentions in Experiment 1: participants’ mean ratings of their own and 
their competitor’s willingness to engage in unethical negotiation behavior in the two 
experimental conditions (self rated first vs. competitor rated first). Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Self-ratings of unethical intentions correlated with ratings of the competitor’s unethical 
intentions (r = .69, p < .001). However, this relationship was stronger when participants 
considered the competitor’s willingness to use unethical tactics first (r = .78, p < .001) than when 
they considered their own unethical intentions first (r = .59, p < .001; Fisher’s Z = 1.97, p = 
.049). A regression analysis predicting self-rated intentions confirmed this finding by revealing 
an interaction between experimental condition and competitor’s unethical intentions (β = 
0.30, p = .001). Participants anchored their own unethical intentions on what they thought their 
competitor would do and did so more when they considered their competitor’s intentions first 
rather than second. 
 
Experiment 2: Unethical Intentions in a Negotiation 
 
Experiment 1 provided initial evidence that considering a competitor’s possible behavior leads to 
greater unethical intentions. However, explicitly asking participants about a competitor’s 
likelihood of engaging in unethical behaviors prior to asking them about their own willingness to 
engage in these behaviors may have produced demand effects. To squarely address this 
limitation, we used a more subtle manipulation of perspective taking and manipulated the 
relational context (competitive vs. cooperative) in Experiment 2. 
 
Method 
Seventy M.B.A. students were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (relational context: 
competition vs. cooperation) × 2 (perspective-taking condition: perspective taking vs. baseline) 
design. 
 
First, we asked participants in the competition condition to recall and describe a time when they 
had competed with someone and how they had felt during the competition. We asked 
participants in the cooperation condition to recall and describe a time when they had cooperated 
or collaborated with another person and how they had felt during this cooperation. 
 
Next, we asked all participants to imagine that they were entering a negotiation with the person 
they had just described. In the baseline condition, we told participants to “take a minute and 
think about how you would approach the negotiation. Specifically, think about what kinds of 
tactics you would use.” In the perspective-taking condition, we asked participants to 
 
take a minute and take the perspective of this other person. That is, try to imagine what 
they would be thinking as they approach the negotiation, and try to put yourself in their 
head, predicting what type of tactics they would use. 
 
Participants then indicated their willingness to use ethically questionable negotiation tactics, 
rating the same SINS items as in Experiment 1 (α = .64). 
 
Results and discussion 
 
We submitted SINS scores to a 2 (relational context: competition vs. cooperation) × 2 
(perspective-taking condition: perspective taking vs. baseline) ANOVA. There was a significant 
main effect for perspective taking, F(1, 66) = 4.32, p = .042, and a marginal main effect for 
relational context, F(1, 66) = 3.10, p = .083. As expected, these effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction, F(1, 66) = 5.88, p = .018 (see Fig. 2). Within the competition condition, 
participants in the perspective-taking condition (M = 3.76, SD = 0.84) were more willing to use 
unethical tactics than were those in the baseline condition (M = 3.02, SD = 0.74), F(1, 66) = 
20.15, p < .001. In contrast, within the cooperation condition, participants in the perspective-
taking condition (M = 3.04, SD = 0.83) did not differ from those in the baseline condition (M = 
3.11, SD = 0.71), F(1, 66) = 0.04, p = .842. Overall, participants in the perspective-
taking/competition condition had higher unethical intentions than did participants in the other 
three conditions combined (M = 3.02, SD = 0.75), t(66) = 4.42, p < .001. 
 
Fig. 2. Self-rated unethical intentions in Experiment 2: mean willingness to engage in unethical 
negotiation behavior as a function of perspective-taking condition (perspective taking vs. 
baseline) and relational context (competition vs. cooperation). Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Experiment 2 provides further evidence that taking the perspective of a competitor can foster 
greater unethical behavior. Furthermore, these effects of perspective taking on unethical 
intentions crucially depended on the relational context (i.e., competition vs. cooperation). 
 
Experiment 3: Deception in a Public-Goods Game 
 
In Experiment 3, we moved beyond self-report measures and examined the interactive effects of 
relational context and perspective taking on actual unethical behavior by placing participants in a 
bargaining context that allowed for the strategic use of deception. 
 
Method 
 
Four hundred twenty adults (57% female, 42% male, 1% with unreported gender; mean age = 
35; 96% from the United States or Canada) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions based on a 2 (relational context: competitive vs. 
cooperative counterpart) × 2 (perspective-taking condition: perspective taking vs. baseline) 
experimental design. Participants first wrote a brief essay describing the type of work they 
enjoyed. Next, we introduced a public-goods game that they would ostensibly play with another 
participant (in actuality, responses were simulated). Following instructions and comprehension 
checks, we manipulated relational context and perspective taking. Participants then exchanged 
messages with their ostensible counterparts and had the opportunity to lie; whether or not they 
chose to lie served as our dependent measure. Finally, they made their final allocation decisions. 
 
Public-goods game 
 
We created a mixed-motive social dilemma in which each participant received an allocation of 
points (1 point = $0.05) that could be invested in a joint pool. Any points contributed to the pool 
grew by 50% and were then divided evenly between both individuals. Points not contributed 
were kept by the individual to whom they were initially allocated. Thus, the maximum joint 
benefit was achieved if both individuals contributed all of their points to the pool, and the 
maximum individual benefit was achieved if a participant contributed nothing to the pool and his 
or her counterpart contributed everything. We informed participants that they would complete an 
unknown number of rounds (actually one) and that on each round, each individual would receive 
a randomly assigned allocation between 8 and 15 points (actually 12), known only to that 
individual. Finally, we told participants, that before making their final allocation decisions, they 
would exchange messages with their counterparts, each indicating the size of his or her 
allocation and the amount he or she intended to invest. We informed participants that these 
messages were nonbinding, implying that they had an opportunity to lie about their intentions to 
their counterparts. 
 
Relational-context manipulation 
 
We manipulated participants’ impressions of their counterparts as either cooperative or 
competitive by revealing their counterparts’ ostensible responses to the question regarding the 
type of work they enjoyed. In these responses, the word than was deliberately misspelled to 
increase believability. Participants in the competitive condition read the following: 
 
I like work that challenges me and that is competitive. I think trying to do better then the 
people around me makes me work harder then my friends or any other person. 
 
Participants in the cooperative condition read the following: 
 
I like working in teams or groups. I think trying to work together towards the same goal 
we can get more done then just people competing against each other. 
 
Perspective-taking manipulation 
 
We then asked participants to think and write about the upcoming exchange of messages. To 
facilitate this exercise, we displayed the actual messages they would complete. Specifically, 
participants saw the following two messages: 
 
I have received an allocation of _________ points. 
I will contribute _________ points. 
 
We directed participants in the baseline condition to describe their thoughts and to indicate how 
they planned to complete their messages. In contrast, we directed participants in the perspective-
taking condition to describe their counterpart’s thoughts. Specifically, we asked participants to 
complete these example messages as they expected their counterpart would if given the same 
allocation they had received (12 points) and why they thought their counterpart would complete 
his or her messages that way. 
 
Unethical behavior 
 
Immediately following the perspective-taking manipulation, participants completed and sent the 
messages reporting the size of their allocation and how much they would contribute to their 
counterpart. We measured unethical behavior as a dichotomous variable indicating whether or 
not participants lied about their point allocation. If participants reported an allocation of 12 
points, we coded them as honest (unethical behavior = 0). If they indicated they had less than 12 
points, we coded them as dishonest (unethical behavior = 1). No one reported receiving more 
than 12 points. 
 
Mediators 
 
We recorded two potential mediators to test the causal aspect of our theory. We derived the first 
mediator from the perspective-taking manipulation. We coded expected behavior as honest (0) if 
participants expected their counterpart to accurately report his or her allocation (i.e., under the 
presumption that the counterpart had received 12 points) and as dishonest (1) if they expected 
their counterpart to report fewer points. All participants then made their final allocation decisions 
after receiving their counterparts’ messages claiming an allocation of 10 points and promising to 
contribute 8. For our second potential mediator, we asked all participants to report how much 
they trusted that their counterpart would be honest with them (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal). 
 
Manipulation and suspicion checks 
 
To verify our manipulations, we asked participants to report how they perceived their counterpart 
(1 = very competitive, 7 = very cooperative) and how much they considered their counterpart’s 
perspective (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal). To assess suspicion, we asked, “Was there anything 
that took place during the course of the study that you found strange, suspicious, or out of place? 
If so, exactly when did you feel this way?” 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Sixty-two participants expressed some level of suspicion about the existence of their counterpart. 
We report analyses for the remaining 358 participants, though results were unchanged when 
suspicious participants were included in the analyses. 
 
Manipulation check 
 
Participants in the competitive condition perceived their counterparts as less cooperative and 
more competitive (M = 2.58, SD = 1.80) than did participants in the cooperative condition (M = 
5.40, SD = 1.44), F(1, 354) = 267.09, p < .001. Similarly, participants in the perspective-taking 
condition reported considering the perspective of their counterparts (M = 5.26, SD = 1.54) more 
than did participants in the baseline condition (M = 4.66, SD = 1.74), F(1, 354) = 12.06, p < .001. 
 
Deception 
 
Ninety-one (25.42%) participants lied to their counterparts about their allocation. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, a logistic regression analysis of unethical behavior revealed a significant 
interaction between relational context and perspective-taking condition (Wald statistic = 
4.62, p = .032). Main effects for relational context (Wald statistic = 0.20, p = .654) and 
perspective-taking condition (Wald statistic = 1.90, p = .168) were not significant. As shown 
in Figure 3, perspective-taking participants were more likely to lie when they perceived their 
counterparts as competitors (34.78%) than when they perceived their counterparts as cooperators 
(17.71%), χ2(1, N = 188) = 6.90, p = .009. In contrast, when participants focused on their own 
perspective, the frequency of lying did not differ between the competitive (23.17%) and 
cooperative (26.14%) conditions, χ2(1, N = 170) = 0.20, p = .654. From the alternative vantage 
point, perspective taking led to an increase in deception among participants paired with a 
competitive counterpart, χ2(1, N = 174) = 2.79, p = .095, and a decrease in deception among 
participants paired with a cooperative counterpart, χ2(1, N = 184) = 1.90, p = .168. Overall, 
participants in the perspective-taking/competitive condition used deception significantly more 
than participants in the other three conditions combined (22.18%), χ2(1, N = 358) = 5.63, p = 
.018. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Unethical behavior in Experiment 3: percentage of participants who misrepresented the 
allocations they received as a function of perspective-taking condition (perspective taking vs. 
baseline) and relational context (competitive vs. cooperative counterpart). 
 
Mediation 
 
As expected, we found that participants taking the perspective of a competitor were more likely 
to expect unethical behavior from their counterpart (M = 57.61%) than were participants taking 
the perspective of a cooperator (M = 32.29%; Wald statistic = 7.14, p = .008). When we 
regressed participants’ unethical behavior on both the counterpart’s expected behavior and 
relational context, we found that the coefficient for expected behavior remained significant 
(Wald statistic = 5.33, p = .009), but the coefficient for relational context did not (Wald statistic 
= 1.70, p = .191). A bootstrap analysis with 5,000 samples produced a confidence interval (CI) 
that did not contain zero, indicating a significant indirect effect, 95% CI = [0.003, 0.036]. 
 
We also found that trust had a negative relationship with participants’ deceptive behavior (Wald 
statistic = 30.05, p < .001). Moreover, we found that perspective taking amplified the 
relationship between relational context and trust, F(1, 355) = 6.40, p < .012. Among participants 
paired with a competitor, those who took their partner’s perspective reported less trust (M = 
3.21, SD = 1.69) than did those who focused on their own (M = 3.73, SD = 1.73), F(1, 355) = 
4.47, p = .035. Among participants paired with a cooperator, those who took their partner’s 
perspective tended to report more trust (M = 5.20, SD = 1.40) than did those took their own 
perspective (M = 4.85, SD = 1.52), F(1, 355) = 2.11, p = .147. When we regressed participants’ 
deceptive behavior on trust and our experimental conditions (i.e., relational context, perspective-
taking condition, and their interaction), the effect of trust on deception remained significant 
(Wald statistic = 27.00, p < .001), whereas the interaction between relational context and 
perspective-taking condition did not (Wald statistic = 1.65, p = .20). A bootstrap analysis with 
5,000 samples produced a 95% CI, [0.054, 0.137], that did not contain zero, indicating a 
significant indirect effect. Taken together, these analyses indicated that expected behavior and 
trust both mediated the interactive effect of relational context and perspective taking on unethical 
behavior. 
 
Discussion 
 
In summary, results were consistent with our hypothesis: Taking the perspective of a competitive 
counterpart led participants to engage in greater deception in a public-goods game by drawing 
their attention to their counterpart’s potential use of the same tactics. Competition perverted the 
effects of perspective taking, leading people down the path of unethical behavior. 
 
Experiment 4: Cheating in an Unrelated Context 
 
Experiment 4 extended the previous three experiments by examining whether perspective taking 
in a competitive context can provoke subsequent unethical behavior in a completely unrelated 
domain. We examined participants’ dishonesty in reporting their performance on a cognitive task 
that was entirely unrelated to a competitive/cooperative relationship they had just recalled. This 
allowed us to test whether perspective taking in a competitive context can activate a self-
protection-at-any-cost mind-set. 
 
Method 
 
Two hundred thirty-three M.B.A. students (39% female and 61% male among those who 
reported their gender; gender data were not collected for one third of the sample) were randomly 
assigned to the conditions of a 2 (relational context: competition vs. cooperation) × 2 
(perspective-taking condition: perspective taking vs. baseline) design. 
 
As in Experiment 2, we manipulated relational context by asking participants to recall either 
competing or cooperating with another person. To manipulate perspective taking, we asked 
participants in the baseline condition to also “state what thoughts you were having when you 
were competing/cooperating.” We asked participants in the perspective-taking condition to take 
the perspective of their partners and “state what the other person might have been thinking when 
you were competing/cooperating.” 
 
Following the recall task, participants were presented with an anagram task designed to study 
cheating behavior (DePalma, Madey, & Bornschein, 1995; Eisenberger & Shank, 1985). 
Specifically, participants were given 3 min to try to solve a series of four anagrams (“CRKO,” 
“LABEVE,” “DSLIE,” and “FTOEER”) on a piece of paper. The first and third anagrams had 
multiple solutions and were quite easily solved (“ROCK,” “CORK”; “IDLES,” “SLIDE”); 
however, the second and fourth anagrams had no solutions. After this task, participants were 
asked to report how many anagrams they had solved. Given that two of the anagrams were 
unsolvable, we coded participants as misrepresenting their performance (unethical behavior = 1) 
if they reported solving more than two and as accurately represented (unethical behavior = 0) 
otherwise. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Twenty-two (9.44%) participants exaggerated their performance on the anagram task. Using  
logistic regression, we found a significant interaction between relational context and perspective-
taking condition in predicting the false reporting of performance (Wald statistic = 5.59, p = 
.018). We also found a main effect of perspective-taking condition (Wald statistic = 3.82, p = 
.051), but no effect of relational context (Wald statistic = 0.10, p = .752). As shown in Figure 4, 
participants who took the perspective of a competitor from their past misrepresented their 
performance more (21.05%) than did participants who took the perspective of a cooperator 
(6.78%), χ2(1, N = 116) = 4.52, p = .034. In the baseline condition, participants who recalled a 
competitor (1.56%) did not differ from participants who recalled a cooperator (8.62%), χ2(1, N = 
117) = 2.34, p = .126. From the alternative vantage point, perspective taking led to an increase in 
unethical behavior among participants who recalled a competitive counterpart, χ2(1, N = 116) = 
6.68, p = .010, but not among participants who recalled a cooperative counterpart, χ2(1, N = 117) 
= 0.14, p = .709. Overall, participants in the perspective-taking/competition condition 
misrepresented their performance significantly more than did participants in the other three 
conditions combined (21.05% vs. 5.68%), χ2(1, N = 233) = 10.46, p = .001. 
 
Fig. 4. Misrepresentation of performance in Experiment 4: percentage of participants who 
overreported their performance as a function of perspective-taking condition (perspective taking 
vs. baseline) and relational context (competition vs. cooperation). 
 
Participants who had previously taken the perspective of a competitor acted more unethically 
than other participants on a subsequent, wholly unrelated, task. This experiment provides 
evidence that perspective taking in a competitive context activates a self-protection-at-any-cost 
mind-set that can spill over into unrelated contexts. 
 
Discussion 
 
Across a series of experiments, we reliably observed an interaction between relational context 
and perspective taking whereby competition combined with perspective taking proved to be a 
unique facilitator of unethical behavior. This pattern of results emerged across various 
instantiations of unethical behavior and using multiple manipulations of competitiveness and 
perspective taking. In Experiment 1, participants who imagined negotiating with a competitor 
were more willing to employ ethically questionable tactics if they considered their competitor’s 
likely behavior before their own. Experiment 2 established that perspective taking interacts with 
the relational context—competitive or cooperative—to predict unethical negotiation intentions. 
Experiment 3 demonstrated that these relationships extend to actual unethical behavior directed 
at other people. Finally, Experiment 4 found that taking the perspective of a competitor creates a 
self-protection-at-any-cost mind-set that carries over into subsequent tasks unrelated to the 
competitor. 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that the effects of perspective taking can change 
dramatically depending on the relational context (i.e., cooperation vs. competition). Although 
perspective taking has long been thought of as the glue that binds people together, our 
experiments demonstrate that it can also act as gasoline that fuels competitive and self-protective 
impulses, leading to deceptive and exploitative behavior, possibly as a prophylactic against 
exploitation by others. Overall, this research extends current understanding of both the 
consequences of perspective taking and the relational antecedents of unethical behavior. 
 
It is interesting that we did not find that perspective taking decreased unethical behavior in 
cooperative contexts. It may be that perspective taking creates the foundation for cooperation, 
but does not increase moral behavior. In addition, participants in the baseline conditions engaged 
in relatively little unethical behavior, which suggests potential floor effects. Future research 
should also explore how relational context and perspective taking might interact with individual 
differences (e.g., social value orientation; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004). These topics remain open 
for exploration. 
 
The current findings dovetail with other recent research on the effects of communication media 
on negotiation outcomes (Swaab, Galinsky, Medvec, & Diermeier, 2012) and on the effects of 
similarity and familiarity on the intensity of rivalry (Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010). 
Specifically, a recent meta-analysis found that richer communication media (e.g., face-to-face 
communication vs. e-mail) enhance the negotiation outcomes of individuals with neutral 
orientations toward one another by creating opportunities for rapport (Swaab et al., 2012). 
However, having more communication channels (e.g., sight plus sound) actually hurts the 
outcomes of negotiators with a competitive orientation, reducing their ability to reach a deal or 
expand the “pie.” Further, a recent study on the origins of rivalry found that greater similarity 
and repeated interaction between competitors breeds more intense feelings of rivalry (Kilduff et 
al., 2010), rather than fostering greater attraction and cooperation, as they normally do 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Newcomb, 1963; Zajonc, 1968). 
 
These disparate findings suggest a broader phenomenon: Factors that increase psychological 
closeness between individuals—perspective taking, face-to-face communication, similarity, 
familiarity—may all serve as relational amplifiers. In cooperative contexts, they smooth the cogs 
of social interaction, but in competitive contexts, they may intensify competitiveness and lead 
people to behave more aggressively and even unethically. Contrary to common intuition and the 
contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), our work suggests that it is wise to maintain psychological 
distance between competitors to prevent social glues from transforming into volatile accelerants. 
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Notes 
 
1.Data on participants’ gender were not collected in Studies 1 and 2. This variable did not 
interact with the experimental manipulations in Studies 3 and 4, all ps > .52. 
 
References 
 
 Allport G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 Batson C. D. (1994). Prosocial motivation: Why do we help others? In Tesser A. (Ed.), 
Advanced social psychology (pp. 333–381). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Batson C. D., Batson J. G., Slingsby J. K., Harrell K. L., Peekna H. M., Todd R. 
M. (1991). Empathic joy and the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 61, 413–426.   
 Batson C. D., Moran T. (1999). Empathy-induced altruism in a prisoner’s dilemma. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 909–924.   
 Coke J. S., Batson C. D., McDavis K. (1978). Empathic mediation of helping: A two-stage 
model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 752–766.   
 
DePalma M. T., Madey S. F., Bornschein S. (1995). Individual differences and cheating 
behavior: Guilt and cheating in competitive situations. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 18, 761–769.   
 
Dovidio J. F., Allen J. L., Schroeder D. A. (1990). Specificity of empathy-induced helping: 
Evidence for altruistic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 249–
260.   
 Eisenberg N., Miller P. A. (1987). The relation of empathy to prosocial and related 
behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 91–119.   
 Eisenberger R., Shank D. M. (1985). Personal work ethic and effort training affect cheating. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 520–528.   
 
Epley N., Caruso E., Bazerman M. H. (2006). When perspective taking increases taking: 
Reactive egoism in social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
91, 872–889.   
 
Galinsky A. D., Ku G., Wang C. S. (2005). Perspective-taking and self-other overlap: 
Fostering social bonds and facilitating social coordination. Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations, 8, 109–124.   
 
Galinsky A. D., Moskowitz G. B. (2000). Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype 
expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 78, 708–724.   
 Gino F., Ayal S., Ariely D. (2009). Contagion and differentiation in unethical behavior: The 
effect of one bad apple on the barrel. Psychological Science, 20, 393–398.   
 Gino F., Pierce L. (2010). Robin Hood under the hood: Wealth-based discrimination in 
illicit customer help. Organization Science, 21, 1176–1194.   
 Johnson L. (2013). Divorce schemes & power games. Retrieved 
from http://www.smartdivorce.com/articles/dirty.shtml 
 Kelley H. H., Stahelski A. J. (1970a). Errors in perception of intentions in a mixed-motive 
game. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 6, 379–400.   
 Kelley H. H., Stahelski A. J. (1970b). Social interaction basis of cooperators’ and 
competitors’ beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 66–91.   
 Kilduff G. J., Elfenbein H. A., Staw B. M. (2010). The psychology of rivalry: A relationally 
dependent analysis of competition. Academy of Management Journal, 53, 943–969.   
 
Kish-Gephart J. J., Harrison D. A., Treviño L. K. (2010). Bad apples, bad cases, and bad 
barrels: Meta-analytic evidence about sources of unethical decisions at work. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 95, 1–31.   
 McPherson M., Smith-Lovin L., Cook J. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in social 
networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 415–444.   
 Nash J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, USA, 36, 48–49.   
 Newcomb T. M. (1963). Stabilities underlying changes in interpersonal attraction. Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66, 376–386.   
 Okimoto T. G., Wenzel M. (2011). The other side of perspective taking. Social 
Psychological and Personality Science, 2, 373–378.   
 
Robinson R. J., Lewicki R. J., Donahue E. M. (2000). Extending and testing a five factor 
model of ethical and unethical bargaining tactics: Introducing the SINS scale. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior, 21, 649–664.   
 
Savitsky K., Van Boven L., Epley N., Wight W. M. (2005). The unpacking effect in 
allocations of responsibility for group tasks. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
41, 447–457.   
 Steinel W., De Dreu C. K. W. (2004). Social motives and strategic misrepresentation in 
social decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 419–434.   
 
Swaab R. I., Galinsky A. D., Medvec V., Diermeier D. A. (2012). The communication 
orientation model: Explaining the diverse effects of sight, sound, and synchronicity on 
negotiation and group decision-making outcomes. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 16, 25–53.   
 Tarrant M., Calitri R., Weston D. (2012). Social identification structures the effects of 
perspective taking. Psychological Science, 23, 973–978.   
 Tenbrunsel A. E., Smith-Crowe K. (2008). Ethical decision making: Where we’ve been and 
where we’re going. Academy of Management Annals, 2, 545–607.   
 Von Neumann J., Morgenstern O. (2004). Theory of games and economic behavior 
(Commemorative ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 Zajonc R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 9(2, Pt. 2), 1–27.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
